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Abstract: In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model that combines structural 
change with repeated product improvements. There are two sectors in the present paper, one is 
traditional sector, and the other is modern sector. The technological progress in the traditional 
sector takes the form of horizontal innovation based on expanding variety, while the technologies 
in the modern sector become not only increasingly capital-intensive but also progressively 
productive over time. The application of the basic model to the less developed economies show 
that the optimal industrial structure in the less developed countries (LDCs) is endogenously 
determined by its factor endowments; the firm in the LDCs that enters the capital-intensive, 
advanced industry in the developed countries (DCs) would be nonviable owing to the relative 
scarcity of capital in the LDCs’ factor endowments; whether the industrial structure matches with 
the factor endowment structure or not is the fundamental cause to explain differences in economic 
performance among the LDCs. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century, the world’s countries have evolved 
into two groups. The first group includes rich, industrialized, developed countries (DCs), while the 
second group includes poor, agrarian, less developed countries (LDCs) (Lin, 2003). Nevertheless, 
prior to the World War II, only a few governments (most notably the Soviet Union) regarded 
economic growth as their direct responsibility and adopted policies for which economic growth 
was the primary stated objective, nor was the development economics a separate field of study 
(Krueger, 1995). In the great revival of interest in economic development that has marked the past 
decade, attention has centered on two main questions: first, what determines the over-all rate of 
economic advance?; second, what is the optimal allocation of given resources to promote growth 
(Chenery, 1961)? There are two different and occasionally controversial approaches to tackle the 
questions above respectively. Analysis of the determinants of the growth rate is the main purpose 
of the modern growth theory, i.e., neoclassical growth theory and recently endogenous growth 
theory, while providing solutions to the second question has relied mainly on the principles, e.g., 
comparative advantage, from trade theory.
1 
According to neoclassical growth theory (e.g., Ramsey, 1928; Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; 
Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965) which focuses its attention on the process of capital formation with 
the assumption of the same given technology between LDCs and DCs, LDCs would grow faster 
than DCs and that the gap in per capita income between LDCs and DCs would narrow because of 
the diminishing returns to capital. Furthermore, if the marginal returns to capital continue to fall, 
the economy will enter a steady state with unchanging standard of livings. These unsatisfying 
conclusions of the neoclassical growth theory have led the current generation of new growth 
theorists to formulate models in which per capita income grows indefinitely (e.g., Arrow, 1962; 
Shell, 1967; Romer, 1986, 1990; Lucas, 1988; Jones and Manuelli, 1990; King and Rebelo, 1990; 
Segerstrom, et al. 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991a; Rebelo, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 
1992).
2 Though new growth theory is insightful for explaining the continuous growth in DCs; 
however, it can not satisfactorily explain the tremendous differences in economic performance 
among the LDCs, as well as the extraordinary growth and convergence during the last three 
decades of the twentieth century of the newly industrialized economies in Asia, and recently China. 
As pointed out by Aghion (2004), the quality improvement paradigm, and new growth theories in 
general, remain of little help for development policy, without regard to specifics such as a 
country’s current stage of development. 
A main development in growth economics in the recent years has been to point at the 
fundamental role of institutions in the growth process (e.g., Acemoglu, et al. 2005), although few 
studies have led so far to precise policy recommendations beyond the general claims about the 
importance of property right enforcement (Aghion, 2004). Appropriate institution theory 
(Acemoglu, et al. 2006) can explain why the organization or institutions that maximize growth, or 
that are actually chosen by societies, vary with distance to the frontier, and they definitely reveal 
some intrinsic relationship between institution and economic growth, but they can not succeed in 
analyzing these institutions’ formalization, change and abandonment. 
                                                        
1  The chief criticism is that comparative advantage is essentially a static concept which ignores a variety of 
dynamic elements (Chenery, 1961). 
2  Please refer to Grossman and Helpman (1994) for the details of three approaches to formulate models in which 
per capita income grows indefinitely.   3
Regardless of the great contribution whether the modern growth theory or the trade theory 
has made, neither of them could successfully explain the following economic phenomenon alone: 
after World War II, although many LDCs’ governments adopted various policy measures to 
industrialize their economies, only a small number of economies in East Asia have actually 
succeeded in raising their level of per capita income to the level in DCs. Lin (2003) met this 
problem by providing a reasonable explanation with intrinsic logic consistency, which argues that 
the tremendous differences in economic performance among the LDCs can be explained largely 
by their governments’ development strategies. Motivated by the dream of national building, most 
the LDC governments, both socialist and non-socialist alike, pursued Catch-up type 
comparative-advantage-defying (CAD) strategy to accelerate the development of the then 
advanced capital-intensive industries after World War II (Lin, 2003). However, an economy’s 
(optimal) industrial structure is endogenously determined by that economy’s factor endowment 
structure. The firms in the government’s priority industries are not viable in an open, competitive 
market because these industries do not match the comparative advantage of their particular 
economy (Lin and Tan, 1999; Lin, 2003).
3 As such, it is imperative for the government to 
introduce a series of regulations and interventions in the international trade, financial sector, labor 
market, and so on so as to mobilize resources for setting up and supporting the continuous 
operation of the non-viable firms (Lin, et al. 2003; Lin and Zhang, 2007).  This kind of 
development mode might be good at mobilizing the scarce resources and concentrating on a few 
clear, well-defined priority sector (Ericson, 1991), but the economy of this type becomes very 
inefficient as the result of misallocation of resources, rampant rent seeking, macro instability, and 
so forth (Lin, 2003). On the contrary, if the government in the LDCs, e.g. the newly industrialized 
economies in Asia, and recently China, pursues the comparative-advantage-following (CAF) 
strategy, which attempts to induce the firm’s entry of industry according to the economy’s exiting 
comparative advantage and facilitate the firm’s adoption of appropriate technology by borrowing 
at low costs from the more advanced countries, the economy will enjoy rapid growth and the 
economic growth rate in these LDCs could be greater than that in the DCs owing to the advantage 
of the latter-comers and the faster upgrades in factor endowments in this LDC (Lin, 2003; Lin and 
Zhang, 2006; and Zhang, 2006), thus, the convergence of these LDCs with DCs would also come 
true. 
The main purpose of the present paper is to develop an endogenous growth model that 
combines structural change with repeated product improvements to discuss the issues of 
development strategy, optimal industrial structure and viability in the LDC in a dynamic 
general-equilibrium framework.
4 There are two sectors in the present model, one is traditional 
sector, and the other is modern sector. The technological change in traditional sector takes the 
form of horizontal innovation based on expanding variety, while the technological progress in 
                                                        
3  A normally managed firm is viable if this firm earns a socially acceptable expected profit without external 
subsidies or protections. Please refer to Lin and Tan (1999) and Lin (2003) for the definition of viability. 
4  The government’s economic policies toward industrial development could be grouped into two different and 
mutually exclusive development strategies: the CAD strategy, which attempts to encourage firms that ignore the 
existing comparative advantage of the economy in their entry/choice of industry/technology; and the CAF strategy, 
which attempts to facilitate the firms’ entry/choice of industry/technology according to the economy’s existing 
comparative advantage (Lin, 2003). Furthermore, there are two types of CAD strategy, one is Catch-up type CAD 
strategy in the LDCs, and the other is adopted mostly in DCs to support certain obsolete labor-intensive or 
resource-intensive industries for the purpose of protecting jobs. The Catch-up type CAD strategy can be referred as 
CAD strategy-type I, whereas the job-protecting CAD strategy can be referred as CAD strategy-type II. In the 
present paper, we focus on Catch-up type CAD strategy in the LDCs only.   4
modern sector is accompanied by incessantly creating advanced capital-intensive industry to 
replace backward labor-intensive one. The results of our model show that an economy’s optimal 
industrial structure is endogenously determined by that economy’s endowment structure; the firm 
in the LDCs that enters the capital-intensive, advanced industry in the DCs would be nonviable 
owing to the relative scarcity of capital in the LDCs’ factor endowments; and whether the 
industrial structure matches with the factor endowment structure or not is the fundamental cause to 
explain differences in economic performance among the LDCs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literatures in 
details. Section 3 constructs a specific model of endogenous economic growth which combines 
industrial structural upgrading with creative destruction. In section 4, we describe the equilibrium 
of the economy described above in infinite horizon firstly, and then characterize the dynamic 
trajectory of the present economy. The dynamic trajectory could be used to characterize the 
evolution of the (optimal) industrial structure in the LDCs. Based on the actual (intentioned) 
industrial structure in the LDC deviating from the optimal industrial structure in this country or 
not; we investigate the issues of development strategy and economic performance in the LDCs in 
section 5. Section 6 contains some brief concluding remarks. Finally, some details of the model 
that do not appear in the text are provided in the appendix. 
2. Related Literature Review 
Before introducing the basic model, it is rewardful for us to discuss some related literature in 
detail. The present paper related to a great number of different literatures. Our paper pertains to 
work on structural change, i.e., the systematic change in the relative importance of various sectors 
(e.g., Kuznets, 1957, 1973; Chenery, 1960; Baumol, 1967; Laitner, 2000; Kongsamut, et al. 2001; 
and Ngai and Pissarides, 2007). In Kongsamut, et al. (2001), the production function of the 
different sectors, i.e., agriculture, services, and manufacturing sector, are proportional, while in 
Ngai and Pissarides (2007) which focuses on exogenous Total Factor Productivity differences 
across different sectors, all sectors have identical Cobb-Douglas production functions. More 
closely related to our paper are Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2005 and 2006), Zhang (2006), Lin and 
Xu (2007) as well as Zuleta and Young (2007). Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2005 and 2006) first 
illustrates, when the elasticity of substitution of different products with different capital intensities 
in the aggregate production function of the final good is not equal to unity, the inevitable outcome 
of directed technical change is the non-balanced growth between different sectors. However, 
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2005 and 2006) only analyzed the transitional dynamics of non-balanced 
growth in the case of exogenous technical change, but did not analyzes the transitional dynamics 
of non-balanced growth of an economy with endogenous technical change. Based on the model 
set-up in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2005), Zhang (2006) extends it to analyze the transitional 
dynamics of non-balanced growth of an economy under endogenous technical change.
5 Zuleta 
and Young (2007) developed a two sector model of non-balanced economic growth with induced 
innovation, in which one sector (“goods” production) with technologies differentiated by the 
elasticity of output with respect to capital and becoming increasingly capital-intensive over time.
6 
Zuleta and Young (2007) further assumes that though every technology is available at any instant, 
                                                        
5  Zhang would like to thank Prof. Acemoglu’s face-to-face talk with him at Yale about the transitional dynamics in 
Zhang (2006). 
6  Seater (2005) developed a one sector exogenous growth model with the similar technical change as in Zuleta and 
Young (2007).   5
the adoption of a technology (i.e., innovation) is costly and the cost to innovation is increasing in 
its capital, thus creates a tradeoff between investment in capital and capital-intensity. In Zuleta and 
Young (2007), however, both the investment to capital deepening, which is tantamount to the 
upgrading of endowment structure in Lin (2003), and the investment to adopt more capital 
intensive production function are the results of optimal decisions by the identical firm at any 
instant, and there is no creative destruction either, i.e., more advanced products render previous 
ones obsolete. Moreover, the real intentions of all these papers mentioned above are to construct a 
model of non-balanced economic growth which is consistent with structural change. Though some 
of the above models are consistent with Kuznets facts (Kuznets, 1957, 1973) as well as the 
well-known Kaldor facts (Kaldor, 1961), none of these papers investigate or are suitable to discuss 
the issues of development strategy, optimal industrial structure, viability, and economic 
performance in the LDCs, which is the main purpose of the present paper. 
There are two sectors in the present paper, one is the traditional sector with horizontal 
innovation as that in Romer (1990), i.e., innovation based on expanding variety which is called 
process innovation in the present paper, the other is the modern sector, whose technologies are 
differentiated by the capital intensities and will become not only increasingly capital-intensive 
over time as that in Seater (2005) as well as Zuleta and Young (2007), but also progressively 
productive over time as creative destruction or vertical innovation in Segerstrom, et al. (1990), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991a), as well as Aghion and Howitt (1992), i.e., innovation based on 
quality improving. In order to make a distinction between the horizontal innovation, i.e., process 
innovation in the traditional sector in this paper, and the innovation in the modern sector with 
increasingly capital-intensive and progressively productive, we denote the innovation in the 
modern sector in the present paper as product innovation.
7There is much likeness in form but 
difference in essence between the product innovation in the present paper and the creative 
destruction or vertical innovation in Aghion and Howitt (1992), etc. Aghion and Howitt (1992), 
the pioneer paper of economic growth through creative destruction, provides a model of 
endogenous growth in which vertical innovations, generated by a competitive research sector, 
constitute the underlying source of growth. All these papers embody the vertical innovations in the 
repeated potential quality improvements, where each new generation of product or input performs 
proportionately better than the last,
8 and therefore the direct conclusion is more advanced 
technologies will be more beneficial to all countries, no matter they are DCs or LDCs. Thus, they 
all lose sight of the specifics such as a country’s current stage of development which is also 
emphasized by Aghion (2004). And none of these papers take accounts the fact that adopting more 
productive technologies also requires higher capital-ratio usage, i.e., the issue of appropriate 
technology in the present paper. 
Appropriate technology was first introduced by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969), and has been 
revived recently by Diwan and Rodrik (1991) as well as Basu and Weil (1998). Basu and Weil 
(1998) is the first paper that provides the formal model to discuss appropriate technology in the 
economic growth framework, and they argue that the technologies are specific to particular 
combinations of inputs, i.e., capital-labor ratio in their paper. Nevertheless, the technological 
                                                        
7  Although the technologies in the modern sectors of the present paper resemble those in Zuleta and Young (2007), 
which are differentiated by the capital intensities and will become increasingly capital-intensive over time, the fact 
that technologies with higher capital intensities would be more productive in the present paper is totally neglected 
in Zuleta and Young (2007). 
8  In fact, the vertical innovations in these papers identified with the cost-reducing innovations.   6
progress in Basu and Wei (1998) is the by-product of “localized learning by doing”, as introduced 
by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969), while in the present paper the technological progress in modern 
sector accompanied by the increase of capital intensity within the generations of product requires 
an intentional investment of resources by profit-seeking firms or entrepreneurs which is 
emphasized in Grossman and Helpman (1994).
9 Based on the endogenous growth model with 
expanding variety, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) argues that many technologies used by the 
LDCs are developed in the OECD economies and are designed to make optimal use of the skills of 
these richer countries’ workerforces, thus, the necessary outcome is low productivity in the LDCs 
owing to the skill scarce in these countries. However, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) cannot 
satisfactorily explain the extraordinary growth and convergence rates during the last three decades 
of the twentieth century for the NIEs in Asia, including Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and recently China (Lin and Zhang, 2006; Zhang, 2006).
10 By extending the model in 
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Lin and Zhang (2006) concludes that the economic growth rate in 
the LDCs which choose the most appropriate (optimal) technologies that match the endowment 
structure of those countries may be greater than those in DCs and convergence can take place in 
these LDCs to DCs owing to the lower costs of technical progress in these LDCs. The endowment 
structure, whether in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) or in Lin and Zhang (2006), nevertheless, is 
skill level, not the ratio of capital to labor which could be upgraded owing to capital deepening in 
the present paper.
11 
Finally, as will be illustrated in the following model, the capital intensity in the modern sector 
will approach the exogenously given parameter δ   asymptotically. Thus, when  1 δ <  , the 
engine of economic growth in the long run is innovations in the present paper, i.e., horizontal 
innovation based on expanding variety (Romer, 1990) in traditional sector and vertical innovation 
(Segerstrom, et al. 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991a; as well as Aghion and Howitt, 1992) in 
modern sector; while if  1 δ =  , in the present paper, there would be two different forces to fuel 
economic growth in the long run. The economic impetuses of the modern sectors come from the 
capital deepening, i.e., upgrading of endowment structure in Lin (2003), as that in Jones and 
Manuelli (1990), King and Rebelo (1990), as well as Rebelo (1991), and the engine of economic 
growth in the traditional sector is process innovation, i.e., horizontal innovation in Romer (1990). 
3. The Basic Model 
3.1 Consumer Behavior 
We consider an economy with  () Lt  workers at time t , supplying their labor without any 
disutility. The population has a constant exponential growth rate  g  . We also assume that all 
                                                        
9  In the model proposed by Basu and Weil (1998), there is never a problem of countries using technologies that do 
not match their level of development. However, Hsieh and Klenow (2007) argues that both China and India would 
get big TFP (Total Factor Productivity) gains from rationalizing allocation of capital and labor in both countries 
(TFP would double), while China appears to have benefited from recent reform efforts, but India shows little gain. 
10  As a matter of fact, the LDCs (South) and the DCs (North) share the same economic growth rates in Acemoglu 
and Zilibotti (2001). 
11  In Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), there is no change of skill level either in DCs or in LDCs, while Lin and 
Zhang (2006) only takes account of exogenous skill accumulation both in DCs and in LDCs.   7
households share identical constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences over total 
household consumption index  (, ) Ct j , and all population growth takes place within exiting 
households, which implies that the economy admits a representative agent with CRRA 
preferences: 
 










− ∫  (1) 
where  ρ  is a subjective discount rate,  0 θ ≥  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and  
(, ) Ct j  represents an index of consumption (sub-utility function) of  j th generation goods at 
time  t . To reflect household’s tastes for diversity in consumption, we adopt for  (, ) Ct j  a 
specification that impose a constant elasticity substitution (CES) between consumption of 
traditional goods, denoted by  1 C , and consumption of modern goods of  j th generation, denoted 
by  2() Cj .
12  Specifically, we have 
  ()
1
12 () ( 1 ) () ,    0 1 Cj C C j
ε ε ε γγ ε ⎡⎤ =+ − < < ⎣⎦
 (2) 
where  (0,1) γ ∈  is the share parameter of the two goods above, and  (0,1) ε ∈  determines the 
elasticity of substitution between consumption goods in traditional sector and that in modern 
sector. It is convenient for us to choose traditional goods as numeraire and denote the price for 
modern goods of  j th generation to be  j p . 
The representative consumer maximizes (1) subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. 
The consumption optimization problem can be solved in two stages. First, the representative 
consumer takes price  j p   as given and chooses  1 C  and  2() Cj   to maximize static utility in (2) 
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subject to statistic budget constrain: 
  12 () () (,) () j Ct pt C j t E t + =  (3) 
The first-order conditions of the above maximization problem yield the following demand 
functions for  1 C  and  2() Cj : 
                                                        
12  We omit time arguments to simplify the notations whenever this causes no confusion from now on.   8
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Substituting (4) and (5) into (2) yields 
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Substituting  () (, ) () j Ct j Et p =ℵ  into (1), the representative agent’s utility function 
becomes 
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The second-stage consumption optimization problem involves choosing the time pattern of 
expenditures  () E t  to maximize (6) subject to the representative consumer’s intertemporal 
budget constraint: 
  exp[ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
t R tR x E x d x B t
∞
−= ∫  (7) 
where  () R t   is the cumulative nominal interest factor from time 0  to  time  t , i.e., 
0 ( ) exp[ ( )]
t
R tr x d x ≡∫  with  (0) 1 R ≡ , and  () B t   is the representative agent’s present value of 
the stream of factor incomes plus the value of initial asset holding at time  t . 
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where  () t ϑ  is the (current value) costate variable associated with the representative consumer’s 
intertemporal budget constraint  (7). 
The intertemporal optimization problem of the above representative agent implies the   9












and the transversality condition 
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where  () rt  is the nominal interest rate at time  t . 
Before leaving consumption side of the economy, it will be useful for our later analysis to 
consider the relationship of the representative consumer’s spending allocated to traditional goods 
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3.2 Producer Behavior and Static Equilibrium 
Turning to the production side, there are only two primary factors of production, capital 
() Kt and  labor  () Lt , and two sectors in the economy. One is traditional sector and the other is 
modern sector. We assume the product in traditional sector, denoted by  1 Y , can be used as 
consumption goods only, while the product in modern sector, denoted by  2() Yj  which is the 
product of  j th generation, can be consumed by households, installed by firms as capital, or 
invested by entrepreneurs as R&D expenditures. 
3.2.1 Producer in the Traditional Sector 
As that in Funkel and Strulik (2000), we assume that the production of the homogenous 
goods  1 Y  in the competitive traditional sector requires the variable inputs capital  () Kt, labor 
() Lt   and an index of intermediates  D, where the production function of traditional goods is 
 
1
11 1 1 F( , , ) ,  0 , , 1 ,   0
KD K D
KDK D YK D L A K D L A
ηη η η ηηη η
−− == ≤ + ≤ >  
We assume  1 1 A ≡  for simplicity without any loss of generality, and we also assume that 
1 D η ≡  to avoid unnecessary complexity in the present paper, thus, the production function of   10
traditional goods becomes
13 
  11 F( , , ) YK D L D = =  
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991b), the index of intermediates  D  is  represented  by 
 
1
0 () ,    0 1
N
Dz i d i
α
α α ⎡⎤ =< < ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∫  (10) 
where  () zi  denotes the input of intermediate good  i ,  N   is the number (measure) of available 
intermediated goods, i.e., the technology in traditional sector, and α  is the elasticity of 
substitution between different intermediated inputs. At every moment in time, the existing 
producers of intermediate goods engage in oligopolistic price competition, and intermediate good 
() zi  is produced with the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
1 () () () ,  0 1 zi li ki
ββ β
− = <<  (11) 
where  () li  and  () ki  is labor and capital employed in the production of the existing 
intermediate good  () zi. 
Facing the given price of the existing intermediate good  () zi, which is denoted by  () qi , 
and the price for the product of the traditional sector, which is normalized to be 1, the inverse 
demanding function for the existing intermediate good  () zi by the competitive firm in the 
traditional sector is given by: 
 
11
1 () ( ) () qi Y zi
αα − − =  (12) 
And the profit maximization problem of the existing intermediate firm i  can  be 
equivalently written as 
 
1( 1 )
1 () , () () . ( ) ( ) . ( ) . ( )
liki Max Y l i k i wl i r k i
αα βα β −− −− (13) 
The first-order conditions in  (13)  are 
 
11 ( 1 )
1 () . ( ) ( ) Yl ik i w
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−−− =  (14) 
 
1( 1 ) 1
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αα βα β αβ
−− − −=  (15) 
Combining (14) with (15) yields the existing intermediate firm i ’s factor demand functions 
                                                        
13  Grossman and Helpman (1994) summarizes that so far there are three approaches to formulate models in which 
per capita income grows indefinitely. If we follow Funkel and Strulik (2000) and assume  0,1 KD η η <<  as 
well as interpret labor  L   as knowledge in Romer (1986) or human capital in Lucas (1988) with spillover effect 
or external effects, then when  1 δ =  , all three approaches in endogenous growth theory will be unified in a 
single model. To our knowledge, by doing so, it would be the first model that unifies three approaches Grossman 
and Helpman (1994) in a single model.   11
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Substituting the existing intermediate firm  i ’s factor demand functions in (16) and (17) into 
(12), then  () qi , i.e., the price of the existing intermediate good  () zi, satisfies 
 
1( 1 ) 1 () ( 1 )   qi wr
β βββ αββ
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Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium, all the existing intermediate firms in traditional sector 
would charge the same price and share identical factor demand functions, which implies 
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Now the production function of the existing intermediate good  () zi i n  ( 1 1 )  b e c o m e s  
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and the production function of the traditional sector in  (10)  could be rewritten as 
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− =−  (25) 
Substituting (24) and (25) into (13), the profit function of the existing intermediate firm  i  in 
traditional sector can be obtained by 
  () ( )
12
1




− =−  (26) 
As that in Judd (1985), Romer (1990) as well as Grossman and Helpman (1990), we also 
assume that production of a new intermediate good require R&D expenditures  1 X  in terms of 
the modern goods devoted to the invention of a new blueprint, moreover, we also assume that 
process innovation outlays are made by private, profit entrepreneurs, who receive indefinite patent 
protection and will appropriate some of the benefits from a new process innovation in the form of   12
oligopoly profits. The oligopolistic entrepreneur of intermediate firm i  in traditional sector’s 
present value of future operating profits from producing  () zi  discounted to time  t   is given by 
  11 ( , ) exp[ ( ) ( )] ( , )
t Vi t R t Rx ix d x π
∞
=− ∫  
where  1(, ) ix π  is the flow profits of firm i  from producing intermediate good  () zi  in 
traditional sector which is expressed by  (26)  at time  x . 
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With the spillover effect from the current stock of knowledge in traditional sector to future 
process innovations emphasized in Romer (1990) in mind, we assume that if  1 X  units  of  modern 




ϕ − =   
where  1 b  is a strictly positive constant measuring the technical difficulty of creating new 
blueprints in traditional sector, and  1 (1 , ) ϕ ∈ −∞   measures the degree of spillovers in technology 
creation.
14 
Then, with free entry by intermediate firm i , if there are positive but finite resources 











=  (28) 
3.2.2 Producer in the Modern Sector 
Producing the product in the modern sector also requires the variable inputs, capital  () Kt 
and labor  () Lt , but not intermediates. The production function of the product of  j th generation 
in the modern sector is given by 
 
1
22 2 2 2 2 () F [ () , ,] () ,   1
jj
j Yj AjK L Aj KL
δδ β δδ
− == − < ≤  
where  δ   is an exogenously given parameter which satisfies   1 δ ≤  ,  2 K ,  2 L  and  j δ  is 
capital and labor used, as well as the capital intensity in the modern sector for the product of  j th 
                                                        
14  Please see Jones (1995), Young (1999), or footnote 21 in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006) for the detailed 
discussion of the range of value of  1 ϕ .   13
generation respectively, and  2() Aj  is the productivity of the  1,2,... j = th generation product. 
The parameters in the present paper which satisfy 1 j β δδ − <<   imply that the modern sector 
is more capital-intensive than traditional sector at any moment. 
Following the literatures on horizontal innovation or creative destruction (e.g., Segerstrom, et 
al., 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991a; as well as Aghion and Howitt, 1992), we assume the 
productivity of the  1,2,... j = th generation in the modern sector, denoted by  2() Aj , is exactly 
1 () j f δδ − −    times as that of the generation before it. That is, we have 
  21 2 () ( ) ( 1 ) j Aj f Aj δδ − = −−   
where  () f ⋅  is an exogenously given function which satisfies  () 1 fx≥ .
15We choose units so 
that the productivity of the lowest generation, i.e., the one available at time  0 t =  (the starting 
point of the analysis), be equal to unity; that is we assume  2(0) 1 A = .
16 
In contrast with the literatures on horizontal innovation or creative destruction mentioned 
above which focus on productivity (or product quality) rising only, the present paper embodies 
product innovation in technological progress with incessantly capital intensive and progressively 
productive over time. We assume that the relationship between capital intensity  j δ  of the 




12 1 () jj j b
ϕ δδ δ δ −− =+ −   (29) 
where  2 0 b >  and  3 0 ϕ > . 
Equation  (29)  implies in infinite horizon we have 
  lim ( )
t t δ δ
→∞ =   
When  1 δ =  , the production function in the modern sector takes the form of 
*
22 2 , lim F [ ( ), , ]
tj AjK L A K
→∞ →∞ =  in infinite horizon, where 
*
22 , lim ( , )
tj AA j t
→∞ →∞ = . In infinite 
horizon, the interest rate would be a constant in the constant growth equilibrium (CGE), which 
will be shown in the next section, requires the productivity in the modern sector to be also a 
                                                        
15 The  function  () f ⋅   in the present paper always equals a positive constant in Aghion and Howitt (1992) as 
well as other paper on vertical innovations. 
16  As the starting point of the analysis, we assume that the modern sector begins at time  0 t =   with one firm 
which has access to a universally known backstop technology in the perfectly competitive output market and factor 
market until the first generation product is invented.   14
constant in the long-run, i.e., 
*
2 A  to be a constant in this case. A sufficient condition that could 
guarantee 
*
2 A  to be a constant is that  () f ⋅  is an increasing function which satisfies 
0






In this paper, we focus here the case of  1 δ <  . When  1 δ <  , the production function in 
modern sector takes the form of 
1
22 2 2 2 ,, lim F [ ( ), , ] lim ( )
tj tj AjK L Aj K L
δ δ −
→∞ →∞ →∞ →∞ =

 in  the 
long-run. The necessary condition that guarantees sustained growth in modern sector is 
0




> , and we assume  () fx λ ≡  for simplicity, where λ  is an exogenously given 
constant and satisfies  1 λ > .




22 2 2 2 () F [ () , ,]
jj j Yj AjK L KL
δ δ λ
− ==  (30) 
Of course, more advanced products, i.e., the product with higher productivity and rising 
capital intensity, could not be produced until they have been invented. We follow the approaches 
taken in Aghion and Howitt (1992) as well as in chapter 4 of Grossman and Helpman (1991b), and 
assume that research in modern sector produces a random sequence of product innovations. Any 
firm in the modern sector that carries out R&D at intensity ι  for a time interval of length  dt  
will succeed in its attempt to develop the product of generation  1,2,... j =   based on the existing 
generation before it with probability  dt ι  which follows a Poisson distribution, and R&D 




ϕ λ ι ≡  in terms of the modern goods 
when the entrepreneur attempts to develop that product, where  2 1( 1 ) 1 ϕδ >− >   reflects the 
fact that the more advanced the technology in modern sector, the more R&D expenditures needed 
for further product innovation in this sector. Furthermore, we assume the parameters of the present 
model satisfy  12 (1 ) (1 )(1 ) αβϕϕ δ α + =−−   to guarantee the balanced growth between the 
traditional sector and the modern sector in infinite horizon. 
Once the product of generation  1,2,... j =   has been invented in the research lab, successful 
innovator obtains a patent which is assumed to last forever on condition that no new generation 
has been invented, or else, the present generation product in the modern sector will be replaced by 
the next generation/vintage. And the producers with the requisite know-how and patent rights can 
manufacture the product of  j th generation in the modern sector according the production 
                                                        
17  Aghion and Howitt (1992) concludes their paper with several directions to generalize and extend the analysis of 
the model, such as assuming that technology is ultimately bounded, thereby requiring the size of innovations 
eventually to fall. 
18  As that in Aghion and Howitt (1992), the present model can be extended to allow firms to choose the optimal 
innovation size  λ .   15
function in  (30). We assume that all firms in modern sector engage in price competition at output 
market and are price-taker at factor market, and we also assume that only one leader-firm, e.g., 
firm  j , in the modern sector has access to the state-of-the-art technology, while another one 
follower-firm, i.e., firm  1 j − , masters the technology that is one step behind it. 
For the moment we assume innovations are always drastic, which means the successful 
innovator is unconstrained by potential competition from the previous patent.
19 
From  (4)  and  (5), the inverse demand function faced by a monopolistic firm  j  in  modern 





























20 then  we  have 

















=  (31) 
Facing the given inverse demand function in  (31), given factor prices  j w  and  j r , the firm 
j   in the modern sector will choose  2 K  and  2 L   to maximize profit, given by: 
  ( ) ()
1
1

















=− −  (32) 













































− =  (34) 
Combining (33) with (34) implies that the factor demand functions of the firm  j  in  modern 












jj j j Lw r
C
ε ε ε








⎧⎫ − ⎪⎪ =− ⎨⎬
⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
 (35) 
                                                        
19  Please see the appendix for the details of the case of nondrastic innovations. 
20  In the present model,  (1 ) j µ −   denotes the savings rate.   16











Substituting (35) and (36) into (32),  we  can  solve out the profit function of the firm  j  in 
modern sector as follows 





















=−  (37) 
And the price of the product of the  j th generation in the modern sector is determined by 
  ( )
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) ( ) ( )
j jj j j
jj j j j p wr
δ δ δδ λε δ δ
− −− − −− =−  (38) 
At time  t , the value to an outside research firm  j  that aims to develop a product whose 
productivity is  λ   times as many as the state of the art and carries out R&D at intensity  ι  when 
this firm is successful in the  j th product innovation, which is denoted by  2(,) Vj t , is the 
expected present value of the flow of monopoly profits  2(,) j x π  discounted to time  t , where 
the duration of  2(,) j x π   follows the exponential distribution with parameter  x ι : 
  22 (,) e x p [() () ] (,) (,)
t Vj t R t R x j x j x d x π
∞
=− ∏ ∫  
where  (,) jx ∏  equals the probability that there will be exactly  j  innovations from the 










= ∏  
The newcomer firm  j  in modern sector would choose research intensity ι  for a time 
interval of length  dt  to  maximize 
 
2
2 max ( , ) ( )( )
j
j Vj t d tpt d t
ϕ
ι ι λι −  (39) 
The maximization problem in  (39)  implies 
 
22
22 ( )( ) ( , ), 0  and  ( )( ) ( , ) 0
jj
jj pt Vj t pt Vj t
ϕϕ λι λ ι ⎡⎤ ≥≥ −= ⎣⎦  
Thus, as long as the R&D operates at a positive but finite scale, we must have  0 ι > , and 
2
2 () ( ) (,)
j
j pt Vj t
ϕ λ = . And the variation of the value to an outside research firm  j  discounted 
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3.3 Market Clearing Conditions 
We close the model by describing market clearing conditions. The output market clearing   17
condition in traditional sector implies 
  11 CY =  
If we neglect the capital depreciation in our model for simplicity, then the output market 
clearing condition in modern sector is: 
  21 2 2 () () Cj KX X Yj ++ + =   
According to the analysis above, the factor market clearing conditions can be expressed as: 
  12 LL L + =  
  12 KK K + =  
where  1 L  ( 1 K ) and  2 L  ( 2 K ) denotes the levels of labor (capital) used in traditional sector and 
modern sector respectively. It is convenient for the analysis below to denote the fraction of labor 
















. From (20), (21), 
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Since the traditional sector and the modern sector share the identical factor prices in 























4. Dynamic Equilibrium 
The dynamic equilibrium in this economy is given by paths for prices of factors, 
intermediates and modern goods w ,  r ,  1 [( ) ]
N
i qi = ,  p , allocations of factors  1 L ,  2 L ,  1 K ,   18
2 K , as well as R&D expenditures  1 X ,  2 X  such that producers maximize profits, and the 
representative consumer choose consumption and savings decision  1 C ,  2 C  and  E  to 
maximize his utility under the market clearing conditions. 
4.1 Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon 
It is convenient for us to study the equilibrium in infinite horizon firstly, and then turn to 
characterizing the dynamic trajectory of the present economy. We guess-and-verify the existence 
of a constant growth equilibrium (CGE) in infinite horizon, i.e., t →∞, such that consumer 
expenditures  () Et  grow at a constant rate 
*











Substituting (8) into (43) implies 
 
** lim ( ) E t rt r g θρ
→∞ ≡ =+  
which means the interest rate in CGE is also a constant. 
We focus here the special case of CGE, i.e., balanced growth equilibrium (BGE), such that 
modern sector and traditional sector grow at the same constant rate in infinite horizon for 
simplicity. The conditions that guarantee the existence of a BGE in the present model is 
  12 (1 ) (1 )(1 ) αβ ϕ ϕ δα + =−−   
which will be proved in the analysis below.
21 
In BGE, the fraction of modern goods of the  j th generation consumed by the households is 
constant, i.e., 
*
, lim ( ) j tj t µ µ
































=   with respect to time  t   implies in BGE 
 
* lim 0 p t
p
g
p →∞ ≡ =

 
Equation (9) and 
* 0 p g =  imply that in BGE the share of the representative consumer’s 
spending allocated to traditional sector, denoted by 
*
1 s , is a constant and 
                                                        
21  The BGE in infinite horizon that we characterize here can be proved to be unique. Moreover, the model 
described here could feature the non-balanced growth between modern sector and traditional sector in infinite 
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Let us first derive the growth rates of the key objects in traditional sector in BGE. 















Thus, the growth rate of traditional sector in BGE is given by 
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=+  (45) 
where 














=+  (46) 
Differentiating the zero-profit condition for firm  i  in traditional sector which is expressed 
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In BGE, we have show that 
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Differentiating the profit function of the existing immediate firm i  in traditional sector 
which is expressed by  (26)  with respect to time  t , we obtain   20
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Now we turn to the growth rate of the key objects in modern sector in BGE. The properties of 
the Poisson distribution imply that in infinite horizon, the expected number of product innovations 
in a time interval of length t  is 
*t ι  (Feller, 1968). Thus, in infinite horizon, the production 
function in modern sector becomes 
 
* 1
22 2 2 2 , lim F [ ( ), , ]
t







* ι   is the optimal rate of innovations in the long-run. 







ιλ δ δ =+ + −
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  
Therefore, the growth rate of modern sector in BGE is given by 
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From  (33), the interest rate in BGE can be expressed by 
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* 1 *


















   (53) 
Differentiating (53) with  respect  to  time t  yields 
 
12 2
** * * (1 ) l n ( 1 ) ( 1) YK L gg g εε ι λ ε δε δ −= + −+ −   (54) 
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The fact that 
12
**
K K gg =  implies the fraction of capital used in traditional sector is a 
constant in BGE, i.e., 
*
K κ  is a constant, where 
* lim ( ) KK t t κκ






δ β →∞ ≡=
−−

 , we know the fraction of labor used in traditional sector is also a 
constant in BGE, i.e., 
*
L κ   is a constant, where 
* lim ( ) LL t t κκ






















Because the product innovations occur in the modern sector according to a time-varying 
Poisson process with instantaneous arrival rate  () x ι   and the expected number of success before 
time  t  equals to 
0 () ( )
t
tx d x ψ ι ≡∫ , thus, the properties of the Poisson distribution imply that 
j λ  amounts to 
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In BGE, the profit function of the firm  j  in modern sector which is expressed by (37) 
reduces to 
  ( ) ()
* 1 *
1
22 2 1 ,
1
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Differentiating (55) with  respect  to  time t  yields 
 
12 2
** * * * *
2 ln ( 1) ln (1 ) YK L gg g ϕι λ ε ε ι λ ε δ ε δ +− = + + −   (56) 
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     22
And the optimal intensity of innovations in the long-run, denoted by 














   
From the analysis above and comparing the growth rate in modern sector with that in 
traditional sector in BGE, we know the parameters of our model which satisfy 
  12 (1 ) (1 )(1 ) αβ ϕ ϕ δα + =−−   
could indeed guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the BGE in the present paper. 
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Finally, the fraction of modern goods consumed by households in BGE, denoted by 
* µ , can 
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as well as the initial conditions of capital  0 K , labor  0 L , and technology in traditional sector and 
modern sector, i.e.,  0 N  and  0 j . 
4.2 Dynamic Trajectory 
Before turning the issues of development strategy, optimal industrial structure, viability, and 
economic performance in the LDCs, we need to study the dynamic trajectories of the economy 
described in the present paper. The dynamic trajectories of this economy can be characterized by 
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Ι≡ .   23
First and foremost, we need to solve out the equilibrium interest rate  () rt in dynamic 



















Secondly, we need to calculate the dynamics of capital intensity in the modern sector. Once 
more, we could invoke the property of Poisson distribution to argue that the expected time of a 
firm in the modern sector that carries out R&D at intensity  () t ι  to develop the product of 
generation  1,2,... j =   based on the existing generation before it is  1( ) dt t ι = . Therefore, from 
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=− Ι . 
Thus, the evolution of normalized accumulative R&D intensity, denoted by  Ι , should satisfy 
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Fourthly, we need to characterize the evolution of the technology in the traditional sector.   24
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 (62) 
Sixthly, it is time for us to understand the law of price change in the present model. From 
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 (63) 
Differentiating (63) with respect to time  t , we obtain the law of the price of the modern 
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   is an infinitesimal and we neglect it in  (64). 
Seventhly, the Euler equation of the representative agent requires the optimal path for the 
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Eighthly, from (9), the dynamics of the fraction of modern goods consumed by households   25
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 , which is an 
infinitesimal, in  (66). 
Ninthly, the market clearing condition in modern sector implies the dynamics of normalized 













(1 )(1 ) (1 ) ( )
1




















=− − − Ι























λ ι ∫ =  with the initial value of technology in traditional sector at the starting 
point of the analysis, i.e., the exact value of  () Nt at  time  0 t = , denoted by  (0) N , as well as 
2(0) 1 A =  assumed  above. 
Summarizing the results above, we can characterize the dynamics of the present 
(decentralized) economy in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: The dynamic equilibrium of the present economy could be characterized by 
an autonomous system of nonlinear differential equations which contains eight variables,  δ ,  Ι , 
n ,  L κ ,  p ,  e,  µ , and  k , given by eight equations (58), (60), (61), (62), (64), (65), (66), and 
(67). Moreover, in infinite horizon, there exists a unique BGE in the present economy. 
5. Optimal Industrial Structure, Viability and Economic 
Performance in LDCs   26
In this section, we will use the above basic model to explore the issues of development 
strategy, optimal industrial structure, viability, and economic performance in the LDCs. We 
consider a theoretical world consisting of a DC and a LDC that shares the identical demographics 
and all households in these countries have the same CRRA preferences.
22  What distinguishes the 
DC and the LDC exogenously is their factor endowment structures, i.e., the relative abundance of 
capital in the DC, denoted by  K , and the relative scarcity of capital in the LDC, denoted by  K , 
while (optimal) industrial structure in the DC and the LDC will be endogenously determined. In 
the present model, the ratio of the capital in the DC to that in the LDC, denoted by  KK , could 
be interpreted broadly, as a metaphor for the LDC’s current stage of development. The larger 
KK  is, the more backward economy in this LDC, and  KK  will decrease and approach 
unity eventually as the LDC converges to the DC. Moreover, the ratio of technologies in the DC to 
those used in the LDC denotes the distance to technology frontiers in the LDC, where  NN  
denotes the distance to technology frontier of the traditional sector, and  jj  denotes the 
distance to technology frontier of the modern sector. When these terms are large, the LDC is far 
from the world technology frontier. 
The facts that technologies adopted by the DC are in the new frontier imply that 
technological progress in the DC could be obtained only through R&D as described in the 
subsection 3.2 of the present paper,
23 thus, the industrial structure of a decentralized economy in 
the DC could be characterized by the autonomous system of nonlinear differential equations 
which contains endogenous variables δ ,  Ι ,  n ,  L κ ,  p ,  e ,  µ , and  k  in the proposition 
1.
24 
For the LDC, however, technological innovation may be the result of technology transfer or 
the imitation of existing technology held by DC. Thus, it is futile, when attempting to understand 
technology choices, (optimal) industrial upgrading and economic performance in the LDCs, to 
focus primarily on mechanisms that generate new technology in the DC. The technological gap 
between DC and LDC is filled with a whole spectrum of different technologies (Lin , 2003), 
providing the actual technologies used in the LDC lie inside the technology frontier of the DC’s, 
and therefore the LDC is faced with the question of which technology in the spectrum is 
appropriate to adopt, i.e., the LDC is required to determine the (optimal) value of technology in 
the traditional sector as well as the (optimal) value of technology in the modern sector, which is 
denoted by  ˆ N , 
ˆ j λ , and  ˆ j δ  respectively.
25 On the other hand, facing the given technologies, 
the LDC is also confronted with the decision of what is the optimal fraction of factors, denoted by 
                                                        
22  In the present paper, the upper bar is used as a superscript to indicate the variables in the DC, while the lower 
bar is an index of the LDC. To simplify the analysis, we also assume there are no international trade as well as no 
capital mobility in the present theoretical world. 
23  Over 90 percent of the R&D expenditure in the world is carried on in the OECD, and over 35 percent is in the 
United States (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001). 
24  Please see appendix for endogenous industrial upgrading of a planned economy in the DC. 
25  We use a variable with a hat to denote its optimal value.   27
ˆL κ  (ˆK κ ), that can be used in the traditional sector.
26 Now it is time for us to provide the exact 
definition of the industrial structure in the present economy. 
Definition 1: In the present paper, we summarize the precise technologies, denoted by  N , 
j λ , and  j δ , as well as the active fraction of labor used in the traditional sector, denoted by  L κ , 
as the industrial structure in a country. 
And the optimal industrial structure in the LDC could be defined as: 
Definition 2: The optimal industrial structure in the LDC, denoted by  ˆ() Nt,  ˆ() j t , and 
ˆ () L t κ , are the paths for  () Nt,  () j t , and  () L t κ  in the dynamic equilibrium which maximize 
the social welfare.
27 
In the following part of this section, building on the model developed in section 4, we begin 
with the dynamic trajectories of optimal industrial structure in the LDC firstly, and then we will 
investigate the issues of development strategy, viability, and economic performance in the LDC 
based on the LDC’s deviating from the optimal industrial structure in this country or not. In 
consideration of the enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) internationally would make 
an impact on optimal industrial structure in the LDC, it is convenient for us to investigate the 
optimal industrial structure in the LDC without IPR protection internationally firstly, then turn to 
the case in the LDC under IPR protection internationally. 
5.1 The Optimal Industrial Structure in the LDC without IPR Protection 
Internationally 
To start with, we assume IPR are not enforced internationally for simplicity, thus, both the 
DC and the LDC have access to the same set of technologies, and the LDC needs not to pay 
royalties to the DC. In consideration of the zero R&D expenditures in the LDC, free-entry 
condition and zero profit condition imply that we could assume the firms in the LDC are price 
takers in product markets as well as in factor markets.
28 
The analysis in subsection 3.2 implies that given the technologies in the LDC, the aggregate 
production function of the traditional goods in the LDC is  () ()
1
1




− =  and the 
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where 
                                                        
26  Given the technologies used in a country, the fraction of factors used in traditional sector will determine the 
output of the traditional sector as well as the output of the modern sector in this country. 
27  We take the utility of the representative household as our measure of social welfare. 
28  In this case, the dynamic equilibrium in the LDC also represents a Pareto-optimal outcome.   28
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with  () () Nt Nt ≤ and  () () j tj t ≤ . 
Under the condition without IPR protection internationally, the assumptions of the economy 
of the LDC in the present paper also satisfy all assumptions of the First and Second Welfare 
Theorems, thus the set of competitive equilibrium allocations and the set of Pareto-optimal 
allocations coincide exactly, and the latter are more simple solutions to the appropriate constrained 
optimization problem. Without IPR protection internationally, the social welfare maximization 
problem of the representative household in the LDC, which is also a Pareto-optimal allocation 
problem can be conveniently decomposed into two component parts. One is a static problem, 
which determines the optimal allocation of capital and labor to the traditional sector and the 
modern sector as well as the optimal technologies used in these two sectors; and the other is a 
dynamic problem which determines the optimal capital accumulation, i.e., the saving rate, in the 
course of economic development. 
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From (68) and (69), we could solve out the optimal fraction of labor, denoted by  ˆL κ , that 
can be used in the traditional sector as the function of  () Kt,  j p ,  () Nt,  and  () j t . 
It is well known that the gross domestic product (GDP) in the LDC, denoted by 
12 () j Yp Y j + , could be written as 
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⎡ ⎤ − ⎣ ⎦ =  into (70) implies that the 
maximand for the GDP in the LDC are the function of  K ,  () Nt,  () j t , and  () L t κ  for the 
given  µ . From the FOCs in (70), we could solve out the optimal value of technology in the 
traditional sector as well as the optimal value of technology in the modern sector, denoted by  ˆ N  
and  ˆ j , as the function of  K  and µ . 
The dynamic optimum implies that the above static allocation must be efficient at all times. 
Substituting  ˆL κ ,  ˆ N  and  ˆ j , all of which are functions of K  and µ , into social welfare 
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as well as  ˆ() () Nt Nt ≤ and  ˆ() () j tj t ≤ . 
This is a familiar problem of optimal control, and we could use Pontryagin’s minimum 
principle to obtain the optimal trajectories for the industrial structure in the LDC, denoted by  ˆ N , 
ˆ j , and  ˆL κ , from the necessary and sufficient conditions for the above optimal program. It is 
obvious that the paths of optimal industrial structure in the LDC without IPR protection 
internationally would depend on the capital K  in this country. Moreover, when the capital 
scarcity in the LDC is severe enough compared that in the DC, i.e.,  () () Kt Kt  , from (68) and 
(69), we must have  ˆ() () j xj x <  and  ˆ() () j j x x δ δ <  for  all x t < . 
The above dynamic equilibrium in the LDC which also represents a Pareto-optimal outcome 
implies that the interest rate in the LDC reaches its maximum value at any moment. The Euler 
equation in  (8)  implies that the economic growth rate in the LDC is positively correlated with the   30
interest rate in this country, and interest rate is a decreasing function of the capital in the LDC. 
Thus, the LDC which follows the optimal industrial structure that maximize social welfare would 
achieve a high rate of growth, i.e., growth miracle, at the preliminary development stage. 
Moreover, because the LDC and the DC share the identical BGE in the long-run, thus, without 
external intervention, the convergence of the economy in the LDC to that in the DC would come 
true ultimately. Summarizing the analysis above, we could establish the following result. 
Proposition 2: (1). Under the circumstance that IPR not enforced internationally, the optimal 
industrial structure in the LDC, denoted by  ˆ N , 
ˆ j λ ,  ˆ j δ , and  ˆL κ , are endogenously determined 
by the factor endowment structure  () Kt  in this LDC; (2). When the capital scarcity in the LDC 
is severe enough compared that in the DC, i.e.,  () () Kt Kt  , we must have   ˆ() () j xj x <  
and  ˆ() () j j x x δ δ <  for  all x t < , which means, at the preliminary stage, the LDC should adopt 
technologies that are inside the technology frontier of the DC; (3). Before a LDC catches up with 
the DC, as long as the LDC follows the optimal industrial structure characterized above, the LDC 
could always experience the most rapid economic growth. Moreover, at its preliminary 
development stage, the economic growth rate in the LDC might be greater than that in the LDC; 
(4). Without external intervention, the convergence of the economy in the LDC to that in the DC 
would come true ultimately. 
5.2 The Optimal Industrial Structure of a Decentralized Economy in the LDC 
under IPR Protection Internationally 
The assumption that that IPR not enforced internationally is, of course, unrealistic. Now we 
turn to the case with IPR enforced internationally. In this case, the LDC could not have free access 
to the frontier technology in the DC, new technologies in the LDC are developed as the result of 
the LDC’s own R&D, imitation, technology imports from the DC or some other forms, and the 
R&D expenditures are indispensable in the LDC no matter of what forms are.
29Thus, at time  τ , 
the LDC whose capital stock equals  () K τ  still faces which is the optimal industrial structure 
she should follow, i.e., the LDC needs to choose  ˆ() N τ ,  ˆ() j τ , and  ˆ () L κ τ .
30We denote the 
(endogenous) industrial structure in the DC whose capital stock equals  () K τ  at time τ  to be 
() N τ ,  () j τ , and  () L κ τ , which are characterized by the autonomous system of differential 
equations in proposition 1 with initial values of technology in traditional sector at time  0 t = , 
denoted by  (0) N , and the initial value of technology in modern sector at time  0 t = , which is 
(0) 1 j =   as assumed previously. 
                                                        
29  We sun up all the expenditures on technical progress in the LDC as R&D expenditures for simplicity. 
30  From the analysis below, we know that once  ˆ() N τ ,  ˆ() j τ , and  ˆ () L κ τ   are determined at time  τ , the 
optimal industrial structure in the LDC would be characterized by an autonomous system of nonlinear differential 
equations resembles to that in proposition 1.   31
Before investigating the issues of optimal industrial structure in the LDC under IPR 
internationally, we need to specify the R&D expenditure equation in the LDC explicitly. As 
regards the R&D expenditures in the traditional sector in the LDC, we assume that if  1 X  units  of 
modern goods engage in research in this sector, they would generate a flow of new products in the 
LDC given by 
  ( )
1 1
11 Nb N N NX
φ ϕ − − =   
where  1 φ  is a exogenously given positive parameter, and parameters  1 b  and  1 ϕ  are the same 
as those in the DC. And we also assume that research in modern sector in the LDC produces a 
random sequence of product innovations. Any firm in the modern sector in the LDC that carries 
out R&D at intensity  ι  for a time interval of length  dt  will succeed in its attempt to develop 
the product of generation  1,2,... j =  based on the existing generation before it with probability 







ϕ λ λλ ι ≡  in terms of the modern goods when the entrepreneur attempts to 
develop that product, where  2 φ  is a exogenously given negative parameter, and the parameter 




() () () () ()
2




ϕτ ι ιτ ι
λ λλι
⎡ ⎤ + + ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎛⎞ ∫ ∫∫ = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 at  time t , where  () j τ   denotes the (initial) 
technology of the modern sector that could (should) be chosen by the LDC at time  τ . 
The R&D expenditure equations above in the LDC reflect the following stylized facts: when 
NN  and  j j  are large, the LDC is far from the world technology frontier, the LDC will 
have more opportunities than the DC in upgrading its technologies, thus, the cost for the LDC to 
upgrade its technologies can be lower than that in the DC; Moreover, as the technologies in the 
LDC approach the technology frontiers in the DC, i.e.,  NN  and  j j   become close to unity, 
the R&D expenditures in the LDC will increase and will be the same as those in the DC 
ultimately. 
The presence of intertemporal-spillover effect implies that the trajectory of (endogenous) 
industrial upgrading in a decentralized economy may not coincide with that in a planned economy. 
Thus, it is necessary for us to draw a distinction between the optimal industrial structure of a 
decentralized economy and the counterpart of a planned economy in the LDC. In the main text, we 
only explore the optimal industrial structure of a decentralized economy in the LDC, while leave 
the case of a planned economy in the appendix. 
Similarly, we could characterize the dynamic trajectories of the decentralized economy in the   32
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Firstly, the equilibrium interest rate in the LDC, denoted by  () rt, in the dynamic trajectory 
is given by: 
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Secondly, the dynamics of capital intensity of the modern sector in the LDC, denoted by 
() t δ , could be attained by: 
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Fifthly, we could derive the fraction of labor used in traditional sector in the LDC, denoted by 
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   is an infinitesimal and neglected in  (75). 
Seventhly, the Euler equation of the representative agent requires the optimal path for the 
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which is an infinitesimal. 
Ninthly, the market clearing condition in the modern sector in the LDC implies the dynamics 
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Finally, the other two control variables  1 X  and  2 X  in the LDC can be calculated as 
()
1 1
11 Nb N N NX
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 with the 
initial condition of technology in the traditional sector in the LDC at time  τ , denoted by  () N τ  
and  () j τ , where  () N τ  and  () j τ   could (should) be chosen by the LDC at time  τ . 
From the results above, we could establish the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: The dynamic equilibrium of a decentralized economy in the LDC under IPR 
protection internationally could be characterized by an autonomous system of nonlinear 
differential equations which contains eight variables, δ ,  Ι ,  n ,  L κ ,  p ,  e ,  µ , and k , 
determined  by eight equations (71), (72), (73), (74), (75), (76), (77), and (78). Moreover,  in  the 
present (decentralized) economy of the LDC, there also exists a unique BGE in infinite horizon, 
which is the same as that in the DC. 
Since the dynamic equilibrium of a decentralized economy in the LDC under IPR protection 
internationally has been solved out in proposition 3, now we could reformulate the optimal 
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subject to the autonomous system of nonlinear differential equations in proposition 3, and 
() () NN τ τ ≤   as well as  () () j j τ τ ≤ . 
Once  ˆ() N τ ,  ˆ() j τ , and  ˆ () L κτ have been determined, the optimal industrial structure in 
the LDC after time τ , i.e.,  ˆ() Nt,  ˆ() j t , and  ˆ () L t κ  at time t τ > , could also be solved out   35
by proposition 3. Thus, we could establish the following result by the same logic as that in 
proposition 2. 
Proposition 4: (1). Under the circumstance that IPR protection internationally, the optimal 
industrial structure in the LDC, denoted by  ˆ() Nt ,  ˆ ˆ() () tj ψ τ + ,  ˆ() t δ , and  ˆ () L t κ , are 
endogenously determined by the factor endowment structure  () Kt in this LDC; (2). When the 
capital scarcity in the LDC is severe enough compared that in the DC, i.e.,  () () Kt Kt  , we 
must have   ˆ() () Nx Nx < ,  ˆ ˆ() () () x jx ψ τψ +< , and  ˆ() () x x δδ <  for all  x t < , which 
means, at the preliminary stage, the LDC should adopt technologies that are inside the technology 
frontier of the DC; (3). Before a LDC catches up with the DC, as long as the LDC follows the 
optimal industrial structure characterized above, the LDC could always experience the most rapid 
economic growth. Moreover, at its preliminary development stage, the economic growth rate in 
the LDC might be greater than that in the LDC; (4). Without external intervention, the 
convergence of the economy in the LDC to that in the DC would come true ultimately, provided 
the LDC follows the optimal industrial structure characterized above.
31 
Summarizing the results in proposition 2 and proposition 4 implies that the optimal 
(appropriate) industry of the modern sector in the LDC at its primary development stage, should 
not be the most advanced and capital intensive industry that adopts the frontier technologies in the 
DC, even there is absence of any barriers for the technology transfer from DC to LDC, because 
LDC takes time to accumulate capital and upgrade its factor endowment structures to achieve the 
level in the DC.
32 
5.3 Development Strategy, Viability and Economic Performance in the LDC 
The government is the most important institution in any economy, especially in LDCs, whose 
economic policies could shape the macro incentive structure that firms in the economy face. The 
government’s economic policies toward industrial development could be grouped into two 
different and mutually exclusive development strategies: the CAD strategy and the CAF 
strategy.
33Based on whether the actual (or intentioned) industrial structure in the LDC coincides 
with the optimal one characterized in subsection 5.1 or in subsection 5.2 or not, in the present 
paper, we could define CAD strategy and CAF strategy rigorously as follows. 
Definition 3: The development strategy pursed by the government in the LDC whose actual 
                                                        
31 It is obvious that, when kk = ,  nn = , and  Ι =Ι, the autonomous system of nonlinear differential 
equations in proposition 3, which characterizes the endogenous evolutions of industrial structure of a decentralized 
economy in the LDC, reduces to that in proposition 1 which characterizes the endogenous evolutions of industrial 
structure of a decentralized economy in the DC. 
32  The intuition for the result stems from the feature of our model that each technology in the modern sector, 
denoted by 
j λ   is appropriate for one and only one capital-labor ratio, denoted by  j δ , thus, the technologies in 
the modern sector are specific to particular factor endowment structure. As pointed out above, the model 
developed by Basu and Weil (1998) has the same feature as that in our paper; however, there is never a problem of 
countries using technologies that do not match their level of development in Basu and Weil (1998). 
33  Please refer to Lin (2003), Lin, et al. (2003), as well as Lin and Zhang (2007) for the details of development 
strategies in the LDCs.   36
(or intentioned) industrial structure coincides with the optimal industrial structure in this LDC is 
denoted to be CAF strategy; while the development strategy pursed by the government in the LDC 
whose actual (or intentioned) industrial structure deviates from the optimal one in this country is 
entitled by CAD strategy. 
Now we could provide a new line of thoughts to analyze the root cause of the differences of 
economic performance in the LDCs, which emphasize the fundamental role of match/mismatch of 
the actual (or intentioned) industrial structure with the factor endowment structures, therefore 
determines the optimal industrial structure of an economy, in determining the economic 
performance in LDCs. 
From the proposition 2 in subsection 5.1, it is obvious that the GDP in the LDC at time  t , 
denoted by  12 () () ( ,) j Yt p t Y jt +   would reach its maximal value when actual industrial structure 
chosen by the LDC, denoted by denoted by  () Nt, 
() jt λ ,  () j t δ , and  () L t κ , coincides with the 
optimal industrial structure, denoted by  ˆ() Nt, 
ˆ() jt λ ,  ˆ()
j t δ , and  ˆ () L t κ , in this LDC. This 
result is summarized in the following corollary. 
Corollary 1: When IPR are not enforced internationally, if a LDC wants to close the gap of 
output per labor with that in DC as well as to accelerate economic growth in this LDC, she has no 
choice but purse CAF strategy and follows the optimal paths of industrial upgrading characterized 
in subsection 5.1. 
As pointed out previously in the present paper, the assumption that IPR not enforced 
internationally is unrealistic. Thus, it is necessary to discuss development strategy, viability and 
economic performance of a decentralized economy in the LDC under IPR protection 
internationally. The results in proposition 4 imply that the actual industrial structure in the LDC 
whose capital stock equals to  () K τ   that pursues CAF strategy under IPR protection 
internationally should coincide with the optimal industrial structure in this country and satisfy 
ˆ() () NN τ τ < ,  ˆ() () j τ ψτ < , and  ˆ() () δ τδ τ <  when  () () KK τ τ   at time τ . However, 
motivated by the dream of national building, most the LDC governments, pursued Catch-up type 
CAD strategy to accelerate the development of the then advanced capital-intensive industries after 
World War II, thus the actual industrial structure deviated from the optimal one in these LDCs. 
When a LDC government pursues Catch-up type CAD strategy, in point of the viability of the firm 
in this government’s priority industries, we could obtain the following proposition (Please see 
appendix for the proof). 
  Proposition 5: When a LDC government pursues Catch-up type CAD strategy, the firm in 
this LDC that enters the capital-intensive, advanced industry in the DCs would be nonviable 
owing to the relative scarcity of capital in the LDCs’ factor endowments. 
Therefore, it is imperative for the government to introduce a series of regulations and 
interventions to mobilize resources for setting up and supporting the continuous operation of the 
non-viable firms and the economy of this type becomes very inefficient as the result of 
misallocation of resources, rampant rent seeking, macro instability, and so forth. 
Finally, based on the analysis in section 5, we could sum up the main result of this paper in   37
the following theorem. 
Theorem 1: Whether the industrial structure matches with the factor endowment structure or 
not is the fundamental cause to explain differences in economic performance among the LDCs. 
And the most important task for the government in the LDC wishing to improve economic 
performance is to get its development strategy right. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In the present paper, we have developed an endogenous growth model that combines 
structural change with repeated product improvements. The distinctive characteristic of our model 
originates from the technology in the modern sector, which becomes not only increasingly 
capital-intensive, but also progressively productive over time as the result of innovation by the 
profit-seeking firms. Owing to each technology in the modern sector is appropriate for one and 
only one capital-labor ratio, i.e., the technologies in the modern sector are specific to particular 
factor endowment structure, we could draw the conclusion that a LDC’s optimal industrial 
structure is endogenously determined by that economy’s endowment structure. Based on whether 
the actual (or intentioned) industrial structure in the LDC coincides with the optimal one which is 
endogenously determined by the factor endowment structure in this economy, the government’s 
economic policies toward industrial development in the LDC could be divided into two different 
and mutually exclusive development strategies: the CAD strategy and CAF strategy. 
If the government in the LDCs, e.g. the newly industrialized economies in Asia, and recently 
China, pursues the CAF strategy, the economy will enjoy rapid growth and the economic growth 
rate in these LDCs could be greater than that in the DCs, thus, the convergence of these LDCs 
with DCs could come true ultimately. On the contrary, most the LDC governments, both socialist 
and non-socialist alike, pursued Catch-up type CAD strategy to accelerate the development of the 
then advanced capital-intensive industries after World War II. However, the firms in the 
government’s priority industries are not viable as shown in the present paper, it is imperative for 
the government to introduce a series of regulations and interventions in the international trade, 
financial sector, labor market, and so on so as to mobilize resources for setting up and supporting 
the continuous operation of the non-viable firms.
34This kind of development mode might be good 
at mobilizing the scarce resources and concentrating on a few clear, well-defined priority sector 
(Ericson, 1991), but the economy of this type becomes very inefficient as the result of 
misallocation of resources, rampant rent seeking, macro instability, and so forth (Lin, 2003). 
Building on the framework developed in the present paper, we have provided a new unified 
line of thoughts to analyze the root cause of the differences of economic performance in the LDCs, 
which argue that whether the industrial structure matches with the factor endowment structure or 
not is the fundamental cause to explain diversity in economic performance among the LDCs. We 
believe the framework developed here is powerful in explaining economic phenomena in LDCs. 
Moreover, it might be useful to generalize and extend the analysis in the present paper, e.g., to 
include financial institutions and investigate the optimal financial structure in LDCs.
35 
 
                                                        
34  Lin and Zhang (2007) has constructed a model to explore the intrinsic logic of government intervention policies 
in less developed countries (LDCs) and argued that many interventionist and distorted institutional arrangements in 
LDCs after the World War II can be largely explained by their governments’ adoption of Catch-up type CAD 
strategy. 
35  Please refer to Lin, et al. (2006) for the detailed analysis of optimal financial structures in the LDCs.   38
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Appendix 
A.1 Nondrastic Innovations 
Until this point we have assumed that innovations are drastic. Now we turn to nondrastic 
innovations. As pointed out by Aghion and Howitt (1992), innovations are nondrastic if and only 
if the previous incumbent (follower) could make a positive profit when the current one (leader) 

















=  which yields an unconstrained maximum to 
the current incumbent’s profit. The follower could not make a positive profit if and only if the 
leader-firm charging a price that falls epsilon below the average cost of this nearest 
competitor/follower, i.e., if and only if the condition 
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were to hold with strict inequality. 
Comparing the RHS in  (79)  with that in  (38)  implies that innovations are nondrastic if and 
only if 
  ()
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From the analysis in section 4, it is obvious that we have  lim j j δ δ
→∞ =  , thus, innovations are 
drastic in infinite horizon equilibrium if and only if  1 λε ≥ . 
Like the case of drastic innovation, in equilibrium of nondrastic innovations, all the capital 
and labor employed in modern sector are combined with the leader-firm. Facing the given inverse 
demand function in (38), given factor prices  j w  and  j r , the leader-firm  j  in the modern 
sector will choose  2 K  and  2 L   to maximize profit 
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From the above profit maximization problem, we could obtain the factor demand functions of 
the firm  j  in the modern sector which are similar to (35) and (36). And the remaining 
unresolved details of dynamic equilibrium in the case of nondrastic innovations also closely 
resemble those of drastic innovations, thus, we focus on the drastic innovations only in the present 
paper for simplicity. 
A.2 Endogenous Industrial Upgrading of a Planned Economy in the DC 
Like that in LDC in subsection 5.1, the social welfare maximization problem in the DC can 
be decomposed into separate static and dynamic resource allocation problems. The presence of 
intertemporal-spillover effect does not alter the static allocation problem of the social planner in   44
the DC. And in the static allocation problem of a planned economy in the DC, given the 
production function in traditional sector which is  () ()
1
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=  and the production 
function in the modern sector which is  ( ) ( )
1 ()
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=   as well as the given price 
of the modern product, denoted by  j p , the optimal employment of factors in the DC implies that 

















































Then the dynamic allocation problem in a planned economy of the DC could be reformulate 
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The above social welfare maximization problem is a standard problem of optimal control, 
and Pontryagin’s minimum principle could be employed to calculate the (optimal) endogenous 
industrial upgrading of a planned economy in the DC. From the Hamiltonian we could derive the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the above maximization problem of the social planner in 
the DC. Given the initial value of technology in traditional sector at the starting point of the 
analysis, i.e., the exact value of  (0) N , and the initial value of technology in modern sector at the 
starting point of the analysis, which is  2(0) 1 A =  as assumed previously, these necessary and 
sufficient conditions would characterize the (endogenous) industrial upgrading of a planned   45
economy in the DC. 
A.3 Optimal Industrial Structure of a Planned Economy in the LDC under IPR 
Protection Internationally 
The optimal industrial structure of a planned economy in the LDC under IPR protection 
internationally could also be decomposed into separate static and dynamic resource allocation 
problems. 
At time τ , in the static allocation problem, given the production function in traditional 
sector in the LDC which is  () ()
1
1
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α
β β α τ
−
− =  and the production function in the 
modern sector which is  () ()
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− + =  as well as the given price of the 
modern product, denoted by  j p , the optimal employment of factors in the LDC implies that we 


























































ˆ ˆ ,, () ,()
(1 ) ( ) 1











⎡⎤ +− − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =− −
− ∫  
subject to the resource constraints 
  () () x x ψ ι =   
  () ()
1
1
1 LK CN L K
α
β β α κκ
−
− =  
  [ ] [ ]
1






=− −  
  () [] []
1 1 1 () ( ) () 22 2
1
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
jj tt j
KL KN N N N K L
b
φ δ δ φψ ϕ φ ψ ϕ λι µ λ κ κ
− +− ++ = − − −   
where  () () () jt j t τ ψ =+. 
Once again, the above maximization problem is a standard problem of optimal control, and   46
Pontryagin’s minimum principle could be employed to solve out the optimal evolution of  () Kt, 
() Nt,  () L t κ , and  () t ψ  or  () jt  at  time t τ > , by the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the above social welfare maximization problem in the LDC derived from the Hamiltonian. Once 
ˆ() N τ ,  ˆ () L κτ, and  ˆ() j τ  have been chosen at time τ , the optimal industrial structure of a 
planned economy in the LDC at time  t τ > , denoted by  ˆ() Nt,  ˆ () L t κ , and  ˆ() jt  could  also  be 
determined. 
Comparing the analysis in subsection A.2 with that in subsection A.3, it is obvious that the 
qualitative results in section 5 still holds for the present planned economy in the LDC. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5 
We will prove proposition 5 based on an extreme assumption firstly, then extend it to the 
general case. The extreme assumption is that we model the Catch-up type CAD strategy in the 
LDC whose capital stock equals to  () K τ   by assuming that the actual industrial structure chosen 
by the government in the LDC coincides with that in the DC whose capital stock equals to  () K τ  
for tractability, i.e.,  () () NN τ τ = ,  () () jj τ τ = ,  () () δ τδ τ = , and  () () LL κ τκ τ =  at time 
τ , when  () () KK τ τ  . 
From the analysis in subsection 3.2, we know that, without external subsidies, as long as the 
R&D operates at a positive but finite scale, the present value of firm  j  in any country 
discounted to time τ , denoted by  2(,) Vj τ , must satisfy free-entry condition, i.e., 
2
2 () ( ) (,)
j
j p Vj
ϕ τ λτ = . Naturally, the present value of the firm in the DC, whose capital stock 
equals to  () K τ , which enters into industry  j  discounted to time τ , denoted by  2(,) Vj τ , 
meets the above free-entry condition precisely, owing to there is a positive and bounded R&D 
intensity in the DC, which implies that we have 
 
2
2 () ( ) (,)
j
j p Vj
ϕ τ λτ =  (80) 
Equation (40) could  be  reformulated  as 
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Differentiating (82) with  respect  to K  obtains 
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  is a higher-order infinitesimal term which could be 
neglected in (83). Therefore, given  () () NN τ τ = ,  () () j j τ τ = ,  () () δ τδ τ = , and 
() () LL κτ κτ =  at time τ , 
2
2 () ( ) (,)
j
j p Vj
ϕ τ λτ >  is a direct conclusion from (80) when 
() () KK τ τ < , thereby we could obtain proposition 5. 





  is a continuous function of its all arguments, thus, 
when there is a severe scarcity of capital in the LDC, i.e.,  () () KK τ τ  , the condition that 
() () N NN ττ =− ∆ ,  () () j jj τ τ =− ∆ , and   () () LLκ κ τκ τ = +∆  when  0 N ∆>,  0 j ∆>, 
and  κ ∆   are all small enough, could still suffice for 
2
2 () ( ) (,)
j
j p Vj
ϕ τ λτ > , where  N ∆ ,  j ∆ , 
and  δ ∆   could be construed as the extent of Catch-Up in the LDC in the present paper. 
Q.E.D. 
 